


System Architecture & Security

Experiences from real life design decisions
or
A network and security expert in API land

Martin Fredriksson
<m@carmensystems.com>



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
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
Contents

- *Introduction*: lightspeed overview of the Carmen system
- *We have assumed control*: System Architecture views
- *Steps in the right direction*: Design examples and discussions

Airline-in-a-box




Carmen development/business model




Why Architecture?

What's wrong with this picture?



Star Architecture



But what about:

Synchronizing activities?

Auditing?


System maintenance?

Deployment?


Network security?

Not enough for a complete *System*...


System Architecture Overview



User Interfaces



Layered System and Security Model



Access Control Model

Key design principles:

Completeness: The ACS must always be invoked (e.g. used in all access methods) and impossible to bypass.

Isolation: The system must be tamper-proof.


Verifiability: The system must be shown to be properly implemented.

Flexibility: The system should be able to enforce the access control policies defined by specific customer needs.

Simplicity: The security policy model should be kept as simple as possible (to minimize ACSdb and audit trail complexity) while still supporting the flexibility principle.

Manageability: The system must be easily manageable, via intuitive user interfaces using terms/rules that users can understand.


Scalability: The system must support the number of users/roles/data classes/resources needed by the customer.




Reference Monitor Access Control model

All attempts by a subject to access an object are controlled by the reference monitor in accordance with a security policy embodied in the access control database. Security-relevant events are stored in the audit trail db (audit file).


Three levels of the ACS




Client/Server Model




Different views for different *roles*




Data Management (DAVE) layered model




DAVE - High Availability




Deployment example



System services (1)



Installing a new machine



Summary

- Security = ACS + Quality
 - Much of the security design is for redundancy, load balancing and other system quality issues
 - Protection against mistakes as well as deliberate attacks
- Real security must be supported by in-depth architecture (and implementation); there just is no shortcut...
- The *network security view* is necessary as a complement to components views
 - Components and APIs for developers
 - Protocols and Data Formats are a must for system security

I conclude that there are two ways of constructing a software design: One way is to make it so simple that there are *obviously* no deficiencies and the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no *obvious* deficiencies.

C.A.R Hoare, Turing Lecture
"The Emperor's Old Clothes",
CACM February 1981, pp. 75-83

THE END